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Abstract
The ability of neural networks to capture relational knowledge is a matter of long-standing con-
troversy. Recently, some researchers in the PDP side of the debate have argued that (1) classic
PDP models can handle relational structure (Rogers & McClelland, 2008, 2014) and (2) the suc-
cess of deep learning approaches to text processing suggests that structured representations are
unnecessary to capture the gist of human language (Rabovsky et al., 2018). In the present study
we tested the Story Gestalt model (St. John, 1992), a classic PDP model of text comprehension,
and a Sequence-to-Sequence with Attention model (Bahdanau et al., 2015), a contemporary deep
learning architecture for text processing. Both models were trained to answer questions about
stories based on the thematic roles that several concepts played on the stories. In three critical
test we varied the statistical structure of new stories while keeping their relational structure con-
stant with respect to the training data. Each model was susceptible to each statistical structure
manipulation to a different degree, with their performance failing below chance at least under one
manipulation. We argue that the failures of both models are due to the fact that they cannot
perform dynamic binding of independent roles and fillers. Ultimately, these results cast doubts on
the suitability of traditional neural networks models for explaining phenomena based on relational
reasoning, including language processing.
Keywords: relational reasoning, generalization, language processing, neural networks, deep
learning
1. Introduction
The ability to represent and reason in terms of the relations between objects plays a crucial
role across many aspects of human cognition, from visual perception (Biederman, 1987), to higher
cognitive processes such as analogy (Holyoak, 2012), categorization (Medin et al., 1993), concept
learning (Doumas & Hummel, 2013), and language (Gentner, 2016). Furthermore, comparative
evidence suggests that relational thinking may be the key cognitive process distinguishing the
abilities of humans from those of other species (Penn et al., 2008; Christie & Gentner, 2010). Given
the relevance of the capacity to represent and reason about relations across cognitive domains,
∗Corresponding author
Email address: guillermo.puebla@ed.ac.uk (Guillermo Puebla )
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
05
70
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
L]
  1
2 M
ay
 20
19
several computational models in cognitive science have sought to capture its main characteristics
and development (e.g., Chen et al., 2017; Falkenhainer et al., 1989; Doumas et al., 2008; Halford
et al., 1998; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003; Kollias & McClelland, 2013; Leech et al., 2008; Lu
et al., 2012, 2019; Van der Velde & De Kamps, 2006; Yuan, 2017).
Computational models of relational thinking differ in their representational assumptions. In
the canonical view, relational thinking entails using predicate representations. A predicate is an
abstract structure that can be dynamically bound to an argument, specifying a set of properties
about that argument (Doumas & Hummel, 2005). For example, predator(x) specifies a series
of properties about the variable x (e.g., carnivore, hunts, etc.). Predicate representations have
two main attributes. In the first place, predicates maintain role-filler independence in that at least
some aspect of the semantic content of the predicate is invariant with respect to its arguments. For
example, predator(fox) and predator(lynx) will specify the same set of properties (e.g., carnivore,
hunts, etc.) about the objects fox and lynx. In the second place, predicates can be dynamically
bound to arguments, namely, fillers can be assigned and reassigned to different roles as needed
during processing. That predicates can be dynamically bound to arguments allows a given concept
to play different roles at different times or in different situations. For example, in a scene where
a fox is preying on a hen, but then a lynx comes and eats the fox, the initial binding of fox
to predator (i.e., predator(fox)) is easily broken and new binding of fox to prey (i.e., prey(fox))
is easily formed. Models based on predicates or formally equivalent systems (i.e., systems that
perform dynamic binding of independent representations of roles and fillers, or symbolic systems)
successfully account for a wide variety of phenomena in the relational thinking literature (for a
review see Forbus et al., 2017).
By contrast, traditional Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) models explicitly eschew the
need for structured representations (see, e.g., Rogers & McClelland, 2014). Representations in
a PDP model correspond to patterns of activation across fixed-size layers of units (i.e., an acti-
vation vector). These representations are unstructured because relational roles and objects are
not independently represented, but instead are represented consecutively, or all of a piece. PDP
approaches to relational thinking seek to obtain relational behavior without invoking symbolic ma-
chinery (St. John, 1992; St. John & McClelland, 1990; Kollias & McClelland, 2013; Leech et al.,
2008; Yuan, 2017). The reasoning behind these models is that if a traditional PDP model suc-
cessfully performs some relational reasoning task, then predicates are not strictly necessary for
that task, and, by extension, might not actually be accurate approximations of human mental
representations. Recently, some researchers have argued that PDP models are capable of handling
relational knowledge. For example, Rogers & McClelland (2008, 2014) have proposed that the
gestalt models of text comprehension (St. John, 1992; St. John & McClelland, 1990; Rabovsky
et al., 2018; Rohde, 2002) exhibit successful effective role-to-filler binding. Some of this optimism
is based, at least partially, on the achievements of deep learning architectures in natural language
processing (NLP). For example, Rabovsky et al. (2018) argue that the success of Google’s neural
machine translation (GNMT) system (Wu et al., 2016) implies that structured representations are,
in fact, an obstacle to accurately capturing the subtle regularities of human language.
In the present study, we tested the Story Gestalt (SG) model (St. John, 1992) and a Sequence-
to-Sequence with Attention (Seq2seq+Attention) model (Bahdanau et al., 2015)—the architecture
behind the GNMT system—in a series of tasks requiring binding a number of concepts to several
roles in a story. All stories had relational structure in the sense that (1) the thematic roles
were organized in specific ways and (2) filling the roles with different concepts yielded different
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instantiations of the story. In our simulations we trained both models in a large number of these
stories to answer questions about the stories and then tested the models with new (untrained)
stories. Importantly, we maintained the relational structure of the test stories relative to the
training stories while varying their statistical structure (by changing the stories’ typical role fillers)
in several ways. Next, we describe the generalities of our task and each model’s operation in detail.
Our task, based on the original materials of St. John (1992), consists on answering questions
about stories generated by a series of (5) scripts. All the scripts describe events as a sequence of
propositions where several concepts play different thematic roles: agent-1, agent-2, topic, patient-
theme, recipient-destination, location, manner and attribute. As an illustrative example, consider
the Restaurant script (see Table 1). This script describes an event where two people go to a
restaurant. Each sentence of the Restaurant script defines fillers for some roles. To generate
a specific instance of a Restaurant script (i.e., a Restaurant story) the roles are given values
corresponding to specific concepts. Table 2 (column 1) presents an example of an instantiated
Restaurant story in a pseudo-natural language format. The first sentence of this story corresponds
to the proposition: agent-1 = Anne, agent-2 = Gary, topic = decided-to-go, patient-theme = None,
recipient-destination = restaurant, location = None, manner = None, attribute = None. Appendix
1 present all possible concepts values for each role. Note that, as illustrated in Table 1, our scripts
produce stories with no repeated topic concepts across propositions.
Table 1: Restaurant Script.
Script
1. <agent-1> and <agent-2> decided to go to restaurant
2. Restaurant quality <expensive/cheap>
3. Distance to restaurant <far/near>
4. <agent-1/agent-2> ordered <cheap-wine/expensive-wine>
5. <agent-1/agent-2> paid bill
6. <agent-1/agent-2> tipped waiter <big/small/not>
7. Waiter gave change to <agent-1/agent-2>
Concept restrictions
The roles agent-1 and agent-2 are never ‘Lois’ or ‘Albert’
Deterministic rule
The quality of the restaurant determines the distance com-
pletely: expensive→ far, cheap→ near
Each script implements a tree structure where each node represents a proposition and each
branch of the tree represents a story. The scripts also implement rules that specify the probability
of transitioning from one node to another conditioned on the value of a character or location
role. For example, a rule in the Restaurant script (see Table 1) specifies that if the restaurant is
expensive, it will be located far away.
We trained the models in two different conditions. In the concept restricted condition, some
character or object names were never used in specific scripts. For example, in the Restaurant
stories the characters Lois and Albert were never used to fill the roles agent-1 or agent-2 (see Table
1; Appendix A presents detailed descriptions of the remaining scripts, their concept restrictions
and rules). In the concept unrestricted condition all concepts were used in all stories. Stories in
both conditions were generated according to the following procedure: (1) a script is chosen at
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random, (2) a sequence of propositions is generated by traversing the probabilistic tree structure
of a scrip and (3) character and vehicles names are given specific values (respecting the script’s
deterministic rule and the script’s concept restrictions in the concept restricted condition).
To get a criterion for each model’s performance we designed a baseline test. In this test we
presented the models trained in the unrestricted condition with concept unrestricted stories and
asked questions about the stories. The questions corresponded to the concepts filling the topic
role. The models generated an answer in the form of a full proposition. The correct answer was
the full proposition in which the topic concept was involved. For example, if a proposition in a
restaurant story stated that the “waiter gave change to Anne” and the model was asked about the
“gave” proposition the correct answer was “waiter gave change to Anne”. Because in our stories
there was no repeated topics the correct answer was unequivocal. Table 2 presents an example of
a Restaurant baseline story, its questions and their corresponding correct answers.
Table 2: Example of a Baseline Story (Restaurant).
Story Questions Criteria
1. <Anne> and <Gary> decided to go
to restaurant
decided
<Anne> and <Gary> decided to go
to restaurant
2. Restaurant quality <expensive> quality Restaurant quality <expensive>
3. Distance to restaurant <far> distance Distance to restaurant <far>
4. <Anne> ordered <cheap-wine> ordered <Anne> ordered <cheap-wine>
5. <Anne> paid bill paid <Anne> paid bill
6. <Anne> tipped waiter <big> tipped <Anne> tipped waiter <big>
7. Waiter gave change to <Anne> gave Waiter gave change to <Anne>
2. Models
2.1. Story gestalt model
The SG model (St. John, 1992, see Figure 1) integrates a sequence of propositions into a
distributed representation of a story, which is then used to answer questions about the story.
The model represents all propositions in its input layer through 137 localist units coding for each
possible filler of each role (e.g., there is a unit coding for Albert-agent and another unit coding
for Albert-recipient). To represent a complete proposition, the units coding for the concept filling
each role are activated. For example, a representation of the sentence Anne and Gary decided to
go to the restaurant would consist of a vector of 137 units were the three units coding for Anne-
agent, Gary-agent, decided-topic and restaurant-location are set to 1 and all other units are set to
0 (Figure 1A).
Figure 1B illustrates the SG model’s architecture. The model is composed of two subsystems.
The first “comprehension” subsystem (input proposition, combination and gestalt layers), receives
each proposition of a story one at the time as input. The activation in the proposition layer feeds
forward to the combination and gestalt layers (100 units each). The gestalt layer has recurrent
connections to the combination layer, which allows the model to form a representation of the story
presented so far (see Figure 1C). The second “query” subsystem (gestalt, question, extraction and
output proposition layers), receives as input the activation of the gestalt layer and the question
layer. The question layer (34 units) consists of a vector of units representing all topic concepts
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Figure 1: Story Gestalt model. (A) An example of an input proposition. (B) Model architecture. (C) Models
operation unfolded over time. See text for details.
in a localist fashion. The extraction layer (100 units) combines the activation of the gestalt and
question layers and feeds forward to the output layer, which has the same dimensionality as the
input layer.
To train a single story the model is presented with increasing longer sequences of the story
propositions and, after each successive sequence, is asked about the last proposition. For example,
imagine a story composed by the last three propositions of the Restaurant story in Table 2 (i.e.,
“Anne paid bill”, “Anne tipped waiter big”, “waiter gave change to Anne”). This story would
be trained by presenting the model with the sequences: [“Anne paid bill”], [“Anne paid bill”,
“Anne tipped waiter big”] and [“Anne paid bill”, “Anne tipped waiter big”, “waiter gave change
to Anne”]. The question for each sequence would be the topic concept of the last proposition of the
sequence (i.e., “paid”, “tipped” and “gave”) and the target (i.e., what the model was trained to
output) would be the last proposition of each sequence (i.e., “Anne paid bill”, “Anne tipped waiter
big”, “waiter gave change to Anne”). The difference between the actual output and the target is
used to train the model through a standard gradient descend algorithm. Once trained, the model
can recover the full proposition associated with each topic of a story. For example, if a trained
SG model is presented with the complete sequence of sentences on Table 2 and then asked about
the topic “decided” (by activating the corresponding localist unit in the question layer) the model
would output an activation vector corresponding to the proposition “Anne and Gary decided to
go to the restaurant”.
St. John (1992) showed that the SG model can recover missing sentences from a story, review
its predictions as it encounters new propositions and resolve pronouns. As an example of the
model’s capabilities consider the case were the model is presented with the complete sequence of
propositions on Table 2 except for the third (“distance to restaurant far”) and is asked about
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the topic “distance”. In this case the model would output an activation vector corresponding to
the proposition “distance to restaurant far” because in its training data expensive restaurants are
always far away (see Table 1).
2.2. Sequence-to-sequence with attention model
In order to test the performance of a contemporary deep learning system on our task, we
implemented a version of the Seq2seq+Attention model (Bahdanau et al., 2015, see Figure 2)—a
deep neural network architecture designed originally to solve machine translation problems. In
translation problems, a source sentence in a given language (e.g., English) has to be translated
into a different language (e.g., French). Typically, the source and target sentences have different
lengths. In general, a Seq2seq model consist of an encoder network and a decoder network. Both
are recurrent neural networks with their own independent time steps (t for the encoder and t’ for
the decoder in Figure 2B). The encoder transforms the input sequence into a sequence of fixed-
size vectors and the decoder processes these transformed vectors to get the output sequence. Two
important features of our particular implementation are the use of word2vec representations for the
input words (Mikolov et al., 2013) and an attention mechanism that allows the model to selectively
attend to different parts of the encoders output (Bahdanau et al., 2015).
... 
... 
Encoder 
(Bidirectional LSTM) 
Decoder 
(LSTM) 
Attention 
mechanism 
Words 
(Word2vec) 
Words 
(softmax) 
st'
at
(B) (C)
st'-1
a1 a2 aT
w = Softmax(e)
e = Feedforward(s, a)...
...
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at: Encoder's 
      output
st'-1: Decoder's state at 
        previous time step
...
(A)
ct' 
"Restaurant"
Figure 2: Seq2seq model with attention. (A) Input representation. (B) The models architecture unfolded over time.
(C) The attention mechanism. See text for details.
Word2vec embeddings (Mikolov et al., 2013) are dense distributed representations obtained by
extracting the activation vector of the hidden layer of shallow neural network trained to predict the
surrounding words given an input word in large corpus of text. Word2vec representations maintain
the distributional patterns of similarity between words, such that words used in similar contexts
have similar representations (however, see Nematzadeh et al., 2017, for evidence of discrepancies
between the patterns of similarity between word2vec representations and the patterns of similarity
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in human word association data). Our version of the Seq2seq+Attention model represents a single
word at each time step t through a layer with localist units for each unique word in the data set
(105 units). To represent a word the corresponding unit is given an activation of 1 while all other
units are given an activation of 0 (i.e., a one-hot vector). This one-hot vector is transformed into
a word2vec embedding (size 300) by a single feed-forward layer with a fixed set of weights (see
Figure 2A). We did not allow the training process to change these weights.
The encoder (bottom part of Figure 2B) corresponds to a bidirectional long short-term memory
neural network (Bidirectional LSTM, Graves & Schmidhuber, 2005). The Bidirectional LSTM is
composed of two LSTM neural networks (250 units each in our model). The first LSTM reads the
input from the beginning until the end of the sequence while the second reads the sequence in a
backwards fashion. At each time step t both LSTMs produce their own output. The full output
of the encoder at is the concatenation of the outputs of the forward and backward LSTMs. The
encoder’s output at each time step t can be understood as a summary of all precedent and following
words to the current word with an emphasis on the words surrounding it (Bahdanau et al., 2015).
The attention mechanism (center part of Figure 2B and Figure 2C) corresponds to a feed-
forward neural network that, at each decoder’s time step t′, takes as input the decoder previous
state st′−1, and all encoder outputs a1 to aT (see Figure 2C). This feed-forward network produces
a single number et for each encoder’s output. This number is intended to capture the degree of
alignment between the current word in the decoder with each word in the input sequence. This
alignment score is normalized using a softmax function, yielding a single attention weight wt for
each encoder’s output. The output of the attention mechanism is a context vector c′t, which
corresponds to the summation of all encoder’s outputs weighted by their corresponding attention
weight. In short, the vector c′t represents a summary of the input words with an emphasis on the
words that “correspond” better with the current output word.
The decoder (top part of Figure 2B) corresponds to a standard LSTM network (200 units)
followed by feed-forward layer with softmax activation. This layer has a unit for each unique
word in the data set (105 units) so that the decoder’s output at each time step corresponds to
a probability distribution over the dataset vocabulary. The model’s answer at each time step is
taken to be the word with maximum predicted probability. As this model is designed to receive
words as inputs, during training we feed the propositions of our task to the model one word at
the time. For each unfilled role we presented the special <NONE> word. After presenting the
complete story, we input a special word <Q> to demarcate the beginning of the question, then
we input the topic question, and finally we input a special word <GO> to tell the model to start
the decoding process. The target output was the sequence of words corresponding to the full
proposition involving the topic concept. The difference between the actual output and the target
was used to train the model in the same way as in the SG model. Figure 3 presents an example of
this process. Here, the Seq2seqs+Attention model (represented by the box) is presented with the
complete sequence of words corresponding to the Restaurant story in Table 2. The model is asked
about the “decided” topic and it responds by outputting the sequence of words corresponding to
the proposition “Anne and Gary decided to go to restaurant”.
3. Simulations
We designed three critical tests for the models. Our tests were designed to maintain the
relational structure of the stories while varying their statistical properties in comparison to the
training data. In short, these tests relied on capturing bindings between roles and fillers in specific
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<N> gave Annechange <Q> decided <GO>
Anne Gary decided <N>
.........
Figure 3: Training Process for the Sequence-to-Sequence with Attention Model. See text for details.
instances while ignoring the statistical regularities from the training data. We termed our first
test concept violation. In this test, we trained the models in the concept restricted condition and
then tested them with stories where the agent-1, agent-2 or the patient-theme roles were filled
by the restricted concepts. The questions consisted on all the topic concepts of the propositions
in which the restricted concepts were used. A role-based answer to the question required using
the restricted concept to fill the corresponding role. Table 3 presents an example of a Restaurant
concept violation story. In this example, the concepts Albert and Lois had never appeared as agents
in any Restaurant story during the model’s training. The model was then tested using a story in
which Albert or Lois appeared as agents in a Restaurant story by asking, for example, about the
“tipped” proposition. The correct (role-based) answer was “Lois tipped waiter big”. Note that,
while the model was trained in stories where Lois appeared as an agent in other locations, and had
been trained to output that someone tipped big with other agents, it had never been trained to
output the exact proposition “Lois tipped waiter big”. Table 3 also presents all the story questions
and their corresponding role-based answers.
Table 3: Example of a Concept Violation Story (Restaurant). Lois and Albert were restricted from instances of the
Restaurant script during training.
Story Questions Criteria
1. <Lois> and <Albert> decided to
go to restaurant
decided
<Lois> and <Albert> decided to
go to restaurant
2. Restaurant quality <expensive>
3. Distance to restaurant <far>
4. <Lois> ordered <cheap-wine> ordered <Lois> ordered <cheap-wine>
5. <Lois> paid bill paid <Lois> paid bill
6. <Lois> tipped waiter <big> tipped <Lois> tipped waiter <big>
7. Waiter gave change to <Lois> gave Waiter gave change to <Lois>
In our second test, termed correlation violation, we presented the models trained in the concept
unrestricted condition with stories where we inverted a perfect statistical regularity of the story
script. For example, in the Restaurant script the value of the attribute role in the second proposition
determines the value of the attribute role in the third proposition in that if the restaurant was
cheap it was nearby and if it was expensive it was far away (see Table 1). To create a Restaurant
correlation violation story, we switched the value of the attribute role in the third proposition
(i.e., a cheap restaurant was now far away, and an expensive restaurant was now nearby). A role-
based answer to the questions of this test would use the input concept in the third proposition
to fill the attribute role, even though it corresponds to a violation of a correlation seen during
training. Table 4 presents an example of a Restaurant correlation violation story, its question and
corresponding role-based answer. In this example the model had been trained in Restaurant stories
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where expensive restaurants are always far away and cheap restaurants are always nearby and the
model is tested in a Restaurant story where an expensive restaurant is close by. The model is
asked about the “distance” proposition and the correct (role-based) answer is that the restaurant
is close by (i.e., “Distance to restaurant near”).
Table 4: Example of a Correlation Violation Story (Restaurant).
Story Questions Criteria
1. <Anne> and <Gary> decided to go
to restaurant
2. Restaurant quality <expensive>
3. Distance to restaurant <near> distance Distance to restaurant <near>
4. <Anne> ordered <cheap-wine>
5. <Anne> paid bill
6. <Anne> tipped waiter <big>
7. Waiter gave change to <Anne>
In our third test, termed shuffled propositions, we presented the models trained in the concept
unrestricted condition with stories where we randomized the order of the propositions. Recall that
in our stories there are no repeated topic concepts. As a direct consequence, a role-based answer to
a question should use the concepts of the proposition corresponding to each question to fill its roles,
ignoring the ordering of the propositions. Table 5 presents an example of a Restaurant shuffled
propositions story, its questions and their corresponding role-based answers. In this example the
model had been trained in stories that followed the same order of propositions as the Restaurant
script (see Table 1). The model was presented with sequences of propositions that corresponded
to a standard unrestricted Restaurant story, with the only difference being that the order of the
propositions was randomized (e.g., the propositions in Table 5 are exactly the same as the ones on
Table 2), so although the model had received all the individual propositions of the story during
training, the model was never trained in the specific sequence being tested. After receiving the
propositions, the model was asked about any of the topics of the story. For example, when asked
about the “quality” topic, the correct (role-based) answer was the proposition “Restaurant quality
expensive”. It is worth to note that in all our tests the correct (role-based) answers required simply
filling the roles of the answer proposition with the concepts that the model had received as input.
Table 5: Example of a Shuffled Propositions Story (Restaurant).
Story Questions Criteria
4. <Anne> ordered <cheap-wine> decided
<Anne> and <Gary> decided to go
to restaurant
5. <Anne> paid bill quality Restaurant quality <expensive>
1. <Anne> and <Gary> decided to
go to restaurant
distance Distance to restaurant <far>
3. Distance to restaurant <far> ordered <Anne> ordered <cheap-wine>
7. Waiter gave change to <Anne> paid <Anne> paid bill
6. <Anne> tipped waiter <big> tipped <Anne> tipped waiter <big>
2. Restaurant quality <expensive> gave Waiter gave change to <Anne>
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3.1. Training
We trained two versions of the SG model, one in 1,000,000 randomly generated concept re-
stricted stories and another in 1,000,000 randomly generated concept unrestricted stories. We also
trained two versions of the Seq2se2+Attention model, one in 500,000 randomly generated concept
restricted stories and another in 500,000 randomly generated concept unrestricted stories. We
used the Nadam optimization algorithm (Dozat, 2016) with default learning parameters. All our
models were implemented in Keras (Chollet et al., 2015) with TensorFlow backend (Abadi et al.,
2016). Full code for all simulations is available from https://github.com/GuillermoPuebla/
RelationReasonNN.
3.2. Results
For each of our tests, we created a dataset of stories by generating 1,000,000 stories and saving
all unique ones. Due to the combinatorics of concepts and scripts, these datasets had different sizes
(baseline and shuffled sentences: 14,652, concept violation: 728, correlation violation: 14,647). For
all tests we compared the proposition generated by the model with the role-based answer. We coded
the answer as correct (with a value of 1) if the all the concept fillers in the answer corresponded
to the concept fillers in the role-based answer and as a non-match (with a value of 0) otherwise.
Figure 4 shows the proportion of correct answers per test and model. Recall that in our baseline test
we presented the models trained in the concept unrestricted condition with concept unrestricted
stories and asked questions about all the propositions in the stories (see Table 2 for an example
of a Restaurant baseline story, its questions and corresponding correct answers). Because the test
stories came from exactly the same distribution as the training stories this test is akin to a recall
test of the training dataset. As can be appreciated in Figure 4, both models performed well in
our baseline test. It is noteworthy that the Seq2seq+Attention model showed a better baseline
performance than the SG model even though it was trained in half the number of stories.
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Figure 4: Results per test and model.
Recall that in our concept violation test we trained the models in the concept restricted con-
dition and then tested them with stories where the agent-1, agent-2 or the patient-theme roles
were filled by the restricted concepts1. The questions consisted of all the topics of the propositions
in which the restricted concepts were used and a correct (role-based) answer required using the
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restricted concepts to fill the corresponding roles (see Table 3 for an example of a Restaurant con-
cept violation story, its questions and corresponding correct answers). In this test the SG model
was unable to use the concepts restricted during training to answer the questions. Instead, the SG
model almost invariably filled the roles of the restricted concepts with the most common concepts
playing that role during training, which is a direct replication of the results of (St. John, 1992).
For example, if the SG model was presented with a story like the one on Table 2 were the roles
agent-1 and agent-2 corresponded to the restricted concepts “Lois” and “Albert”, the model tended
to output answers where the agent-1 and agent-2 were any of the other unrestricted agents (e.g.,
“Barbara” or “Clement”). The Seq2seq+Attention model performed significantly better at this
test, achieving a slightly better level of accuracy than in the baseline test. The attention mech-
anism seems to allow this model to apply its word representations to sequences where the words
appeared in previously unseen stories.
Recall that in our correlation violation test we presented the models trained in the concept
unrestricted condition with stories where we inverted a perfect statistical regularity of the story
script and asked about the proposition that violated the perfect statistical regularity. The correct
(role-based) answer required using the input concept even though it violated a statistical correlation
from the training dataset. For example, because in the Restaurant script expensive restaurants
are always far away, a Restaurant correlation violation story would establish that an expensive
restaurant is close by and the correct answer to the “distance” question would be a proposition that
states that the restaurant is indeed close by (see Table 4). Importantly, both models performed
poorly in the correlation violation test, in other words, neither model was consistently able to
correctly process texts that violated a perfect correlation seen in the training dataset. Such behavior
would seem quite unnatural for a human reader as it would amount to, when presented with a
proposition stating that a restaurant is close by, answering the question “where is the restaurant”
by stating the restaurant is far away. It is noteworthy that the SG model achieved a higher accuracy
than Seq2seq+Attention model in this test (although both models performed quite poorly). We
suspect that the same attention mechanism that allows the Seq2seq+Attention model to pass the
concept violation test makes it even more likely to overfit to a perfect correlation in the dataset.
Recall that in our shuffled proposition test we presented the models trained in the concept
unrestricted condition with concept unrestricted stories where the order of the propositions was
randomized. A correct (role-based) answer required to use the concepts of the proposition corre-
sponding to each question to fill its roles, ignoring their ordering (see Table 5 for an example). While
the randomization of the order of the propositions affected both models, the SG model performed
significantly better than the Seq2seq+Attention model in this test. We again hypothesize that the
attention mechanism is the main reason for this difference in performance. Unfortunately, because
of the length of our stories, taking out the attention mechanism yields the Seq2seq+Attention
model unable to pass our baseline test (baseline performance around 0.5), so for now we were not
able to test our hypothesis directly.
1Although these concepts were never used the in the context of each specific script, they were seen in the training
dataset as a whole. By definition, the output of any traditional neural network to a completely new (unseen) concept
depends on its initial weights. Given that these weights are initialized randomly, the behavior of a neural network
regarding an unseen input will be essentially random (Marcus, 1998).
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4. General discussion
We tested the relational processing capabilities of the SG model and the Seq2seq+Attention,
a classic connectionist model of text comprehension and a contemporary text processing deep
learning architecture, respectively. In three critical tests we varied the statistical properties of the
test stories while keeping their relational structure intact. Our results show that both models are
able to use the statistical regularities of the training data to learn to answer questions correctly for
stories that came from the same distribution as the training corpus. More importantly, however,
our simulations demonstrate that the performance of both models is severally affected when the
statistical properties of the test stories differ from those in the training corpus. Because we kept
the relational structure of the test stories intact, our results show clearly that these models are
not using the relational information of the stories to answer the questions, but instead they are
relying on the statistical regularities of the training dataset. In addition, although the technical
advances of Seq2seq+Attention model made it able to pass our concept violation test, this benefit
came at the cost of performing worse than the SG model in the correlation violation and shuffled
proposition tests.
Both models failed in our tasks demonstrating that they do not perform dynamic binding of
independent roles and fillers (see, e.g., Doumas & Hummel, 2005, 2012, for discussions). A model
that dynamically binds roles to fillers will easily pass our tests by filling the untrained concepts
into the trained roles to answer the questions (see, e.g., Doumas et al., 2008; Falkenhainer et al.,
1989; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997). It appears that successfully dealing with instances that massively
violate the statistics of experience requires representations that explicitly support dynamic binding.
Our results are highly consistent with the findings of Lake & Baroni (2018, see also Loula et al.
(2018)), who found that sequence-to-sequence models (with and without attention mechanism)
failed at a command-to-action translation task that required composing the meaning of new com-
mands formed by using known primitive concepts combined in ways unseen during training. Even
in the minority of cases were their models showed behavior that seemed compositional, they did
it in a very non-human way (e.g., in one test their best performing model could correctly produce
the action sequences corresponding to the instructions “turn left”, and “jump right and turn left
twice”, but not the one corresponding to “jump right and turn left”).
Truly compositional behavior requires independent representations of objects and roles that can
be bound together dynamically (i.e., compositional representations require a solution to the binding
problem). In particular, compositionality results when a system can recursively apply predicate
representations over other predicate representation (e.g., loves(John, loves(Mary, Richard)), see
Doumas & Hummel, 2005, for a discussion). We have shown that traditional PDP models (including
current deep learning models) do not, as instantiated, perform dynamic binding. As a consequence,
these models systematically fail when a task requires violating well learned statistical associations.
As such, while there are certainly instances wherein the representations that these models learn
will produce the same results as compositional representations, the resulting representations are
not truly compositional. To the extent that human mental representations are compositional (see,
e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Fodor, 1975; Lake et al., 2017; Marcus, 2001; Tenenbaum et al.,
2011), then traditional PDP models fail as successful approximations of human cognition.
One of the most important evolutionary advantages of relational reasoning is the ability to
base inferences on relational roles disregarding the content of their arguments. This capacity
allows us to make relational generalizations to completely new inputs (Penn et al., 2008). As
traditional neural networks cant, by definition, make use of untrained units to perform successfully
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in given a task (Marcus, 1998), these models rely on spanning the input space to achieve good
generalization (see Doumas & Hummel, 2012). Word embeddings like Word2vec (Mikolov et al.,
2013, cf. Miikkulainen & Dyer (1991)) can be seen as a technique to deal with this phenomenon.
Even though in our Seq2seq+Attention model some concepts were not trained in some contexts,
the vector representation of all concepts of a certain type (e.g., agents like “Anne” and “Lois”) had
similar representations because they appear in similar contexts in the Word2vec training dataset.
Another strategy to deal with new concepts (or new combinations of concepts) involves directly
spanning the input space so that there are no truly new inputs to the model. For example, it
is standard practice in neural networks research to make random splits of the data to obtain the
training and test datasets. When the data are instantiations of relational structures (as in our
tasks) this makes very likely that most objects appear as the fillers of most relational roles in the
training dataset, which transforms the relational generalization problem in a interpolation problem,
where the correct answer corresponds to an intermediate answer between two known cases (see
Lake & Baroni, 2018, for a demonstration of the effects of random versus systematic splits on the
training/test datasets). It is for this reason that traditional PDP models (e.g., O’reilly & Busby,
2002) and contemporary deep learning models (e.g., Hill et al., 2019) targeted to solve relational
reasoning tasks really on spanning the input space in order to achieve high levels of generalization.
Importantly, none of these techniques are solutions to the deeper problem of generalizing to new
concepts or new combination of concepts based on abstract relations.
It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that deep learning models struggle with tasks that require
far transfer (for a review see Marcus, 2018). For example, deep learning models of text comprehen-
sion are susceptible to adversarial attacks that add untrained sentences, that share words with the
correct answer, to the test text (Jia & Liang, 2017). Notably, ungrammatical distractor sentences
have a stronger adversarial effect than grammatical ones, which suggest that these models are
relying in a superficial strategy to solve the reading comprehension task.
However, all of the above is not to say that neural network models cannot, in principle, integrate
operations that allow them to implement a truly symbolic dynamic binding system. For example,
the symbolic-connectionist models SHRUTI (Shastri & Ajjanagadde, 1993), LISA (Hummel &
Holyoak, 1997, 2003), and DORA (Doumas et al., 2008; Doumas & Martin, 2018), use time as a
binding signal that allows for role-filler independence and dynamic binding.
Interestingly, there has been a resurgence of interest on the binding problem in the neural
networks (Besold et al., 2017; Franklin et al., 2019) and computational neuroscience literature
(Fitz et al., 2019; Pina et al., 2018). Moreover, relational learning and reasoning have become
a core topic on deep learning research (Battaglia et al., 2018; Greff et al., 2015; Santoro et al.,
2017; Hill et al., 2019) with some deep learning architectures starting to implement operations
traditionally associated with symbolic processing such as a content-addressable memory (Santoro
et al., 2016; Graves et al., 2016; Weston et al., 2014). Whether these non-traditional neural network
architectures are capable of relational reasoning remains an open question that we plan to address
in future research. Our results suggest, however, that for a model to successfully account for all
aspects of relational processing, it will need to implement a solution to the binding problem.
Finally, while we herein illustrate the limitations of traditional neural networks when facing
relational reasoning tasks, we hope that the results will motivate cognitive scientists and machine
learning researchers to tackle the problem of relational learning and reasoning by first tackling the
problem of dynamic binding. In the domain of neural network models, doing so will most likely
will require us to go beyond the architectural constrains of traditional neural networks.
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Appendix A. Concepts and Story Scripts
Table A.6: Concepts Used in all the Scripts.
Roles Concepts
agents
Albert, Clement, Gary, Adam, Andrew, Lois, Jolene, Anne, Rox-
anne, Barbara, he, she, jeep, station-wagon, Mercedes, Camaro,
policeman, waiter, judge, AND
topics
decided, distance, entered, drove, proceeded, gave, parked, swam,
surfed, spun, played, weather, returned, mood, found, met, qual-
ity, ate, paid, brought, counted, ordered, served, enjoyed, tipped,
took, tripped, made, rubbed, ran, tired, won, threw, sky
patients or
themes
Albert, Clement, Gary, Adam, Andrew, Lois, Jolene, Anne, Rox-
anne, Barbara, he, she, jeep, station-wagon, Mercedes, Camaro,
ticket, volleyball, restaurant, food, bill, change, chardonnay, pros-
ecco, credit-card, drink, pass, slap, cheek, kiss, lipstick, race, tro-
phy, frisbee
recipients or
destinations
Albert, Clement, Gary, Adam, Andrew, Lois, Jolene, Anne, Rox-
anne, Barbara, he, she, jeep, station-wagon, Mercedes, Camaro,
beach, home, airport, gate, restaurant, waiter, park
locations beach, airport, restaurant, bar, race, park
manners long, short, fast, free, pay, big, small, not, politely, obnoxiously
attribute
far, near, sunny, happy, raining, sad, cheap, expensive, clear,
cloudy
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Table A.7: Bar Script.
Script
<agent-1> met <agent-2> at the bar
AND if agent1 = rich (1.0):
<agent-1> enjoyed expensive-wine at the bar
AND if agent1 = cheap (1.0):
<agent-1> did not enjoy expensive-wine at the bar
<agent-2> ordered a drink to the waiter at the bar
AND if agent2 = rich (1.0):
The drink was expensive
AND if agent2 = cheap (1.0):
The drink was cheap
OR (2):
(0.5):
<agent-2> made a polite pass at <agent-1>
OR (2):
(0.3):
<agent-1> gave a slap to <agent-2>
<agent-2> rubbed cheek
(0.7):
<agent-1> gave a kiss to <agent-2>
<agent-2> rubbed lipstick
(0.5):
<agent-2> made a obnoxious pass at <agent-1>
OR (2):
(0.7):
<agent-1> gave a slap to <agent-2>
<agent-2> rubbed cheek
(0.3):
<agent-1> gave a kiss to <agent-2>
<agent-2> rubbed lipstick
Concept restrictions
The roles agent-1 and agent-2 never correspond to ‘Andrew’
or ‘Barbara’
Deterministic rule
The action of agent-1 determines what agent-2 rubes com-
pletely: slap→ cheek, kiss→ lipstick
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Table A.8: Park Script.
Script
<agent-1> and <agent-2> decided to go to the park
The distance to the park was <near/far>
<agent-1> got in <vehicle>
<agent-1> drove <vehicle> to the park for a <short/long> time
<agent-1> proceed to the park fast
<agent-1> parked at the park for <free/pay>
The weather was sunny
<agent-1> ran through the park
<He/She> threw a Frisbee to <agent-1/agent-2>
Concept restrictions
The roles agent-1 and agent-2 never correspond to ‘Clement’ or
‘Roxanne’
Deterministic rule
The distance to the park determines driving time completely:
near → short, far → long
Table A.9: Airport Script.
Script
<agent-1> decided to go to airport
Distance to airport <near/far>
<agent-1> found change
<agent-1> drove <vehicle> to airport <short/long>
<agent-1> ran to gate
<agent-1> met <agent-2> at airport
<agent-1> <agent-2> returned home
Concept restrictions
The roles agent-1 and agent-2 never correspond to
‘Gary’ or ‘Jolene’
Deterministic rule
The distance to the airport determines driving time
completely: near → short, far → long
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Table A.10: Beach Script.
Script
<agent> decided to go to the beach
The beach was far away
OR (2):
(0.5):
<agent> entered <vehicle>
<agent> drove <vehicle> to the beach for a long time
AND if agent1 = male (1.0):
<agent> proceeded <vehicle> to the beach fast
AND (0.5):
The policeman gave a ticket to <agent>
(0.5):
<agent> drove <vehicle> to the beach for a long time
AND (0.8):
<agent> swam in the beach
<agent> won the race in the beach
AND if agent1 = male (0.87):
<agent> surfed on the beach
<agent> spun
AND if agent1 = female (0.33)
<agent> surfed on the beach
AND (0.33):
<agent> played volleyball in the beach
OR (2)
(0.8)
The weather was <sunny>
<agent> returned home for a long time
<agent> was in a <happy> mood
(0.2):
The weather was <cloudy>
<agent> returned home for a long time
<agent> was in a <sad> mood
Concept restriction
The roles recipient and patient never correspond to ‘Camaro’
Deterministic rule
The weather determines the agent’s mood completely:
sunny → happy, cloudy → sad
21
